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ABSTRACT
America's refitting its businesses for global competition. The nation's views on affirmative action
(how much it should cost) is a part of the process. This article examines and critiques recent cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court. The views of the justices highlight shifting attitudes
about affirmative action policy in labor relations, building construction, and employee-employer
relationships.
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White men control most of the money and property in the world. In a global economy, they are
losing control to the Japanese. To protect what they own, they've formed international confedera-
tions. On the national scene, they've reinterpreted their laws to both (a) cut their losses and (b)
identify people who can help them. The cases that follow symbolize what has happened.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the beginning the world was a wilderness. Scarcity was a fact of
life. Liberty was freedom from scarcity. Civilization described man-
kind's experiment with government (the promises entombed in constitu-
tions ennobling government guarantees to provide everyone with food
and personal security). The Constitution of the United States epitomized
what was promised to Americans. We African-Americans, for example,
were anointed with the right to participate in American economic life.
Last session, the Supreme Court proclaimed that your rights, as fash-
ioned by cities and states, are what I will recognize or I will select the
moment when you can realize those rights.
As incredible as it might seem, knowing what reputable scholars
have written about American history, the Court believes that blacks can
discriminate against whites (that is absurd).I The Court believes that the
1866 Civil Rights Act was written for white people (that is absurd).2 The
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1. City of Richmond v. J.A.. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-97 (1989).
2. Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2711, 2713 (1989).
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Court has decided that the states cannot police racism (that is madness).3
It has hinted that black employers should not punish white employees. 4
It has decided that white people, if they are race conscious, can overturn
settlement contracts in employment discrimination cases. 5
This is hate speech.6 A dominant group (through an interpretation
of its own laws) has told a subordinate group what to expect from con-
tracts.7 It has created a psychic cage. To get free from it, as my elders
would say, one must use something like art or protest literature to pound
out reality. Once reality is recast, there are questions to be answered.
First, to what indignities have African-Americans quietly submitted?8
Second, what is their injury?9 Third, is it coercion or a loss of first-class
citizenship? to
There is a taste for discrimination in America.t' African-Americans
have been told that their political leadership is suspect.' 2 They have been
told that statistical evidence of segregation is not enough to overturn an
3. See City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 490-93 (fourteenth amendment constraint on state power
and use of race as criterion for legislative acts).
4. Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2708-10.
5. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-69 (1989); see Spitz, Erosion of Efforts to Stem Job Bias
Grows, Civ. LIBERTIES 7, col. I (Spring 1990).
6. Why did the court decontextualize the 1866 Civil Rights Act? Eg., Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2388 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissenting). Why did the Court go out of its
way to describe the race of the disputants in a first amendment case? Eg., Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2706-
08. Why did the Court say the states (cities) were anointed with the power to promulgate legislation
addressing past discrimination and, in the next breath, overturn a city ordinance on the subject?
City of Richmond, 480 U.S. at 490-93. On some level, these opinions exhibit an indifference or an
active dislike, for historically oppressed groups. Some might call it hate speech. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2332-34
(1989)[hereinafter Matsuda]. A dominant group has interpreted the laws as disrupting the flow of
equal rights that Congress promised oppressed groups. Id.
7. Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2332, 2334.
8. See id. at 2337-38. First, black businesses get marginalized. Second, there's a lowering of
status. Third, people surmise that these decisions ridicule them. Fourth, people feel powerless. Id.
9. See id. at 2336. The victims have to shoulder emotional distress. They must cope with
displaced aggression, fear, anger, nightmares and psychosis. Id. This type of speech erodes freedom
of association. Id. at 2337. It forces the victims to change their outward behavior and public de-
meanor. When the working environment is charged against them, they are likely to do what is
necessary to avoid a barrage of hate speech. Id. at 2338. The Court's negative determinations signal
a loss of civil rights. E.g., Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2729 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(remedial scheme of
§ 1983 preempts otherwise available statutory remedies); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 662-63 (1989)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(Court turns "blind eye" to Title VII's purpose and
meaning).
10. See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2337 n.88. Hate speech forces victims to behave in ways
prescribed by the dominant group. That is coercion. When hate speech assumes legal forms, includ-
ing legislation or judicial decrees, it tells the victims they are powerless. They are told that their
legal concerns are less worthy or that they cannot exercise rights to protect themselves like the
dominant group. Id. at 2338. This is second class citizenship.
11. See E. BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT EsTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY AND CASTE IN
AMERICA 104-08, 170-74 (1966)[hereinafter E. BALTZELL] (Americans used science and statistics
"proving" Anglo-Saxons at "top of evolutionary tree").
12. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 484, 495-96 (1989); see id. at 529
(Marshall, J., dissenting)(notes majority's opinion will keep states and local governments from trying
to change past discrimination).
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employment practice. 13 They have been told that a Civil Rights Act does
not cover subjects previously considered by Congress. 14 They have been
told that "they will have to wait for their remedies" or "act quickly to
preserve them."'
15
In the pages that follow, we will examine the cases which give rise to
these observations. We will use a contracts analysis. 16 There are the
petitioners' stories, the holdings of the Court and the contract's critique.
At the end, we will revisit the question, "Were these cases written from a
narrow cultural perspective?"
13. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 650-52. Since the case restructures Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430, a civil rights case prosecuted by African-Americans, it admonishes them to
produce better evidence in employment discrimination cases.
14. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2379, 2381-82, 2388 (1989).
15. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). A collective bargaining agree-
ment governed the contract between Lorance and AT&T. Lorance earned competitive seniority
points by working in an AT&T plant. Her seniority was deemed permanent after promotion to a
higher paying job as a tester. On July 23, 1979, with the assent of management, the union modified
the collective bargaining agreement. Thereafter, the time a person spent in a promoted position
determined permanent seniority. Id. at 901-02.
A down turn in the economy forced AT&T to demote some of its employees. The demotions
were made in accordance with the modified collective bargaining agreement. As fate would have it,
Lorance was a demotion victim. Because she lost four years of seniority, which had been permanent
under the old collective bargaining agreement, she brought an action against AT&T. She claimed
that the collective bargaining agreement discriminated against women. The district court dismissed
her case, holding that her action was barred by a statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, and subsequently the United States Supreme Court, affirmed the district court decision.
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 827 F.2d 163 (1987).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), Lorance had 300 days to file a complaint regarding the collective
bargaining agreement. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 903 n.2. The time ran from the date the agreement was
adopted by labor and management. Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting). If the complaint was not
filed in the allotted time, the agreement was void. The plaintiff was saddled with a double burden.
She had to show an intent to discriminate and that the defendants used the collective bargaining
agreement to that end. Id. at 908-09. The 300 days had run. Because the plaintiff did not prove an
intent to discriminate, the Court could not say that the agreement was invalid. Id.
What is stunning about this opinion is Justice Scalia's omissions. He did not use or note legisla-
tive history to interpret the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See id. at 901-12 (recent cases used by Scalia in
broadening court's scope, diminishing Title VII's impact); see also id. at 913-19 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting)(Title VII goal never included conferring absolute immunity on discriminatorily adopted
seniority systems surviving first 300 days). Scalia did not follow his cited cases. Id. at 915-19 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Finally, the cases Scalia cited were inapposite. Id.
16. See FRIED, CONTRACTS AS PROMISE 1-43, 71 (1981). If the parties agree to burden sharing
and the agreement is legal, a contract is the sum of promise and acceptance. A promise is a declara-
tion to do something or to do nothing. Acceptance is an acknowledgement of the promise and some
communication signifying acceptance. Id. Contracts are composed of mutual and dependent
promises. The parties must act in good faith and spend best efforts. See La Shelle v. Armstrong, 188
N.E. 163, 166-67, 263 N.Y. 79, 84 (1933)(duty to act in good faith and follow wording of the con-
tract); Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1119-1120
.(1981)(parent-best efforts)[hereinafter Goetz & Scott]. Some are obliged to make an event happen,
that is, to labor mightily when they can make a condition happen.
A defending party may use contract principles or provisions in contracts when performance
breaks down. The prosecuting or injured party may be entitled to damages in expectation, reliance,
or restitution. If the subject matter is unique, the injured party may be entitled to specific perform-
ance or injunctive relief.
There are other ways to depict contract formation. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACTS 87-90
(1974). The lawyer's modern day preoccupation is defining good faith - doing the opposite of
ruining the other parties expectation - and ignoring the wording of contracts and appropriate stat-
utes. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2720, 2722 (1989)(one must do
nothing in an employment contract that amounts to racial harassment); E. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS 526, 527 (1981)[hereinafter E. FARNSWORTH]; Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Con-
tracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 932 (1942)[hereinafter Constructive Conditions].
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II. CASES
A. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
There is a Louis Brandeis saying: "Dissents are educational de-
vices."' 7 In a dissent mode that isn't fashionable in the 1990s, these cases
marginalized black businesses and black employees. The United States
Supreme Court mangled the strict scrutiny test and recast the fourteenth
amendment to retrench white dominance.
Let us begin with the City of Richmond v. Croson Co. On April 11,
1983, the city council adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan. The
Plan required prime contractors (to whom the city awarded construction
contracts) to spend thirty percent of the dollar amount of their agree-
ments on Minority Business Enterprises (MBE). " "The Plan defined an
MBE as a business at least 51% of which is owned or controlled ... [by]
Blacks, Spanish speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts."' 19 The
Plan was free of geographic limitations. 20 A MBE, anywhere, could
qualify for a set-aside.
The Plan was remedial. It promoted wider minority participation in
the construction of public projects. The Plan authorized the Director of
the Department of General Services to fashion a rule allowing waivers in
situations where the minority requirement could not be met. To that
end, the Director promulgated something called "Contract Clauses, Mi-
nority Business Utilization Plan."' 2' Section D carried the following
language:
No partial or complete waiver of the foregoing (30% set-aside) require-
ment shall be granted by the city other than in exceptional circum-
stances to justify a waiver. It must be shown that every feasible
attempt has been made to comply, and it must be demonstrated that
sufficient, relevant, qualified Minority Business Enterprises... are un-
available or unwilling to participate in the contract to enable meeting
the 30% MBE goal.22
The Director published procedures to be followed in letting city
contracts under the Plan. Bidders were given a "Minority Business Utili-
zation Commitment Form.''23 The winning bidder "was required to sub-
17. E. BALTZELL, supra note 11, at 195.
18. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). The Court said: Legisla-
tion bearing a racial classification is suspect. It is subject to the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 493; cf.
Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1989)(Williams, J., dis-
senting)(FCC's goal in giving minorities licensing preferences inescapable of placement in non-racial
terms). Strict scrutiny personifies the Court's low tolerance for state-sponsored racial classifications.
The government must present compelling reasons to overcome the Court's inclination to overturn
the legislation. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990)(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Overturning segregation, overturning discrimination, addressing the effects of past dis-
crimination, and integrating the academy are (all) compelling reasons. Id.
19. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 478.
20. Id. at 469.
21. Id. at 478.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 479.
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mit a commitment form naming the MBEs to be used on the contract
and the percentage of the total contract price awarded [to MBE]. '' 24 The
contractor's commitment form or request for waiver was processed by
the City Human Relations Commission (HRC). The HRC verified the
MBEs' names or made a recommendation regarding the prime contrac-
tor's waiver request. Thereafter, the Director of General Services made a
determination from which there was no appeal.
25
At a hearing before the City Council to determine whether the plan
ought to be adopted, the Council considered the following:
(1) A statement by Councilperson Marsh that "the general conduct
of the construction industry in this area [Richmond], and the State,
and around the nation, is one in which race discrimination and exclu-
sion on the basis of race is widespread;"
(2) A statement that "while the general population of Richmond was
50% black, only .67% of the city's prime construction contracts had
been awarded to minority businesses (between 1978 and 1983);" and
(3) Evidence that "4.7% of all construction firms in the United
States were minority owned businesses and that 47% of these were
located in California, New York, Illinois, Florida, and Hawaii."
'26
There was no direct evidence, at least the council collected no evi-
dence, of racial discrimination on the part of the city in letting contracts
or any evidence that the city's contractors had discriminated against mi-
nority-owned subcontractors. The public witnesses indicated that the
minority contractors were simply unavailable.2
7
On September 6, 1983, the city published an invitation for bids on a
project. Croson Company, a mechanical plumbing and heating contrac-
tor, received a bid form. The job involved the installation of water
closets and urinals for the city jail. Croson contacted several MBEs.
None expressed interest in the project or the tendered quotes.28
On October 12, 1983, Croson contacted another group of MBEs.
Melvin Brown, the president of a local MBE at that time, expressed an
interest in the project. Brown, however, ran into difficulty. Area white
vendors would not supply him with needed fixtures or price quotations.29
On October 19, 1983, Croson submitted a request for a waiver of the
30% set-aside. Croson's request indicated that Brown was not a quali-
fied subcontractor and that the other MBEs had shown no interest. Hav-
ing been told that Croson had submitted a waiver request, Brown
pursued talks with a vendor who promised to supply fixtures at competi-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 479-80.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 482.
29. Id. One of the vendors was not a minority business enterprise (MBE) and refused to give a
price quote. An MBE is defined as "a business [in which] at least fifty-one (51) percent is owned and
controlled... by minority group numbers." Id. at 478. Another area vendor would not give Brown
a price quote indicating that a credit check would need to be done first. Id. at 482.
[Vol. 30
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tive prices. 30 This information was communicated to the city before it
acted on Croson's request. The city told Croson that it had decided to
re-bid the project. 3' Croson appealed the decision. The city said that
there was no appeal. Croson filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983,
the Civil Rights Act. He said that the Richmond Plan was
unconstitutional. 32
Can a government impair a person's freedom to contract? The an-
swer is yes when it is the federal government and it is legislation pro-
duced under the commerce clause or the fifth section of the fourteenth
amendment. 33 Sadly, state governments are anointed with a weak power
to limit a person's freedom to contract. 34 The vehicle must be legisla-
tion. 35 The subject matter must be racial discrimination. 36 The racial
discrimination must be something that is policed by the federal govern-
ment. 37 The discrimination must be something in which the state is ac-
tively (passively) participating.
38
City of Richmond, I'm sad to say, is a cruel decision. It was written
by a justice who should have known better. Madame Justice O'Connor
hides behinds Justice Powell's plurality opinions in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke 39 and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion,40 as if they were majority opinions, to saddle racism with a new
definition. History is rewritten in a way that seems pleasing. She orders
states and cities to do nothing (except what they are told to do by higher
authorities) to respond to racism. She has made nonsense of the strict
scrutiny test. She has trivialized the evidence compiled by the city for
enacting the ordinance. She has given racism another day to poison our
consciousness. In her haste to champion individual rights, she has af-
firmed the role that Social Darwinism plays in American life.
To commit oneself to the elimination of a race conscious society is a
laudable societal goal. Regrettably, the goal is unachievable if a majority
of the white middle class or the middle class of all groups is not commit-
ted to it.4 1 It is pointless (if you think about the situation from the vic-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 483.
33. Id. at 487.
34. Id. at 489-90.
35. Id. at 491.
36. Id. at 492.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see id. at 556 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(meaning of "identified discrimination" require-
ment of proof discussed).
39. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
40. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
41. See E. BALTZELL, supra note 11, at 183-86, 198-200, 353-62 (discussion of minorities' ex-
clusion from country clubs); AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 246-47, 284-86 (4th ed. 1978)[here-
inafter MALCOLM X]. In the twentieth century, civil rights mean assimilation on the basis of culture
- not genes. If one can parrot the white man's values and solve his problems, one can participate in
his public life. Id. at 285-86. The individual can achieve this. E. BALTZELL, supra note 11, at 188-
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tim's perspective) to be free of the burdens of race if you are unhealthy,
uneducated, and operating without skills that attract money, employ-
ment, and opportunities. The Richmond Plan tried to correct that.
Justice Marshall's dissent is uplifting.42 States, he said, have an obli-
gation to eradicate the effects of past discrimination. 43 They are obliged
to do nothing to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. 44 States
should not spend money on industries that profited from private discrim-
ination.45 It is disingenuous for a court to critique evidence piece-by-
piece. 46 Evidence has never stood in alien juxtaposition. 47 It's the body
of evidence that counts. If states and cities are sovereign within their
own domain, it was hypocritical for the Supreme Court to trivialize what
local officials said about a problem and how they wished to address it.48
When government sponsored racism is an issue, the strict scrutiny
test makes sense when the government has used power to give aid to
racial hatred or the oppression of non-European groups.4 9 Racism is not
any group's effort to use public office to promote the group's interest.
Using the strict scrutiny test in that way (blocking government action to
address the effects of past discrimination in Virginia) makes no sense.
Finally, telling a city to adopt an urban business plan that has been
discredited by Congress was disingenuous. 50 The Richmond Plan oper-
ated prospectively. It was innovative. It did not disrupt settled expecta-
tions of innocent parties.5' The plan got entangled in the fears provoked
by race, and the Court wouldn't free it.
B. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District is a good faith case.52 Jus-
tice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion. Once again, Madame Justice
hid in a maze of reconstruction history. 53 She redefined racism.54 She
96. A person's colleagues and associates will determine the heights he will climb on society's social
ladder. Id. at 206, 209, 316. Civil rights opportunities, in this sense, have not been offered to Afri-
can-Americans. Id. at x (preface).
42. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 528-62.
43. Id. at 536-37.
44. Id. at 537.
45. Id. at 537-39.
46. Id. at 541.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 546.
49. See id. at 537; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1530-31 (1988)[here-
inafter L. TRIBE](discussion of Justices' positions on affirmative action).
50. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 550.
51. Id. at 549.
52. Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2711, 2713 (1989). The Court said that
the 1866 Civil Rights Act was bereft of language authorizing a damage remedy. The plaintiff would
have to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain damages. When a public official punishes an employee be-
cause the employee has exercised a federal citizenship right, like the first amendment, the official is
liable to the injured party. Id. at 2713.
53. Id. at 2710-20 (O'Connor, J., majority).
54. See id. at 2727-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(Brennan affirms idea that § 1981 also applies to
white people); Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Ad-
[Vol. 30
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sent a false signal about employment relations when African-Americans
fire European-Americans from jobs."5 She misinterpreted Congressional
intent concerning the scope of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.56 She wrote an
opinion (subscribed to by four associates) depriving injured citizens of a
damage remedy.
Jett was employed by the Dallas Independent School District. He
was a teacher and a football coach at South Oak High School. Jett was
white. His immediate supervisor, the principal, was black. As the
school's population changed from white to black, Jett found himself
fighting the principal over school policy. Their differences reached a cli-
max after a high school football game. The coach stormed into a refe-
ree's locker room to announce to the referees present, that he would
block black officiation of his football games. In a state of rage, shortly
after this scene, Jett told the press that "his black players could not pass
NCAA academic requirements for collegiate athletes. '""T
The coach's actions upset the school principal. The principal told
Coach Jett that South Oak could do without his services. After a meet-
ing with the district's superintendent, Jett was assigned to a school that
did not have a football program. At the new school, after his work qual-
ity had slipped, he was relieved of his teaching responsibilities and as-
signed to school security.5 8
Thereafter, Jett filed a lawsuit against the South Oak principal and
the Dallas School District. He characterized himself as white. He
sought damages under the 1866 Civil Rights Act. He said that (a) his
immediate supervisor was black; (b) his supervisor disliked him; (c) his
supervisor, with the approval of the district's superintendent, relieved
him of his job because he had exercised his first amendment right.
The Court examined the language in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. It
discovered the language did not cover the first amendment right the com-
plainant sought to protect. In the majority opinion, the Court pro-
claimed that the 1866 Civil Rights Act affirmed the rights of white
people while anointing freedman with the same rights. 59 The Act did not
provide a citizen with a damage remedy. Congress, the Court pro-
claimed, did not create an "original federal jurisdiction" to support a
damage remedy against state actors. 6°
mission of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939 (1985). The Civil Rights Act con-
firms the rights of white people while anointing blacks with the same rights as white people. Id. at
944-47.
55. Jett, 109 S. Ct. at 2708, 2710. The black supervisor's reaction to a racist comment ending
in discharge of employee may be suspect or racist. Id. at 2708.
56. Id. at 2729-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2707.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2710, 2713.
60. Id. at 2712, 2714-15.
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Since Congress contemplated a penal provision under the old stat-
ute, the complainant had to use an amendment to the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 to get damages from the state. Any person who uses
his office to deprive a citizen of his United States citizenship rights is
liable to the injured party.61 When a municipality (pursuant to a policy)
tramples upon citizenship rights by punishing a person for the exercise of
free speech, it's liable to the injured party. The person invested with the
authority to make final decisions is obliged to pay damages.62
Aside from the criticism paraded in a previous case, which is also
applicable to this one, the court has sent a strange signal about good
faith. In employment contracts cases, good faith is embodied in § 1983.
In the midst of performance, you cannot punish an employee for exercis-
ing his first amendment right. Although the original Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1981, covers contracts, you can neither proclaim nor use it as a
standard for appraising a person's performance.
63
C. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 64 is the next case. The plaintiff,
Patterson, was an African-American. The defendant was a business.
The plaintiff made a contract with the defendant. During performance
complainant's compatriots, the white employees similarly situated, were
accorded better treatment.65 Patterson sought a promotion from her em-
ployer, McLean Credit Union, which was refused. Thereafter, she
brought an action under the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff stated
the following:
[Her supervisor] periodically stared at her for several minutes at a
time; that he gave her too many tasks, causing her to complain that she
was under too much pressure; that among the tasks given her were
sweeping and dusting, jobs not given to white employees. On one oc-
casion, she testified, [her supervisor] told [her] that blacks are known
to work slower than whites. According to the petitioner, her supervi-
sor also criticized her in staff meetings while not similarly criticizing
white employees. 6
6
After the case wound its way through the federal courts, the
Supreme Court announced that an employer can't use race to bar con-
tract formation.67 It resisted the temptation to construe the right clause
in the 1866 Civil Rights Act as an order to look at state laws devoted to
61. Id. at 2722.
62. Id. at 2723, 2724.
63. Id. at 2720.
64. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). The Court blocked the use of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 198 1, to evaluate the employer's performance for breach of contract and the employee's pursuit of
damages. The Court said the employee had to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 2374, 2375.
65. Id. at 2369, 2373.
66. Id. at 2373.
67. Id. at 2372-74.
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contracts. 68 Because there was not a state statute on white employees
harassing black employees during performance, succumbing to the temp-
tation to look at state law would have made the 1866 Civil Rights Act
meaningless. 69 Undaunted and armed with words like "logic" and "se-
mantics," the Court narrowed the Act. It said that the statute covered
only contract formation. It did not cover the conduct of an employer
after a relationship had been established. The Court intimated that good
faith issues, like harassing an employee because he's black, were gov-
erned by the 1964 Civil Rights Act.70 It said that promotions could be
both new and distinct contractual opportunities. If a person was denied
a promotion because of her race, she would have a 1866 Civil Rights
action.
71
What can one say about this opinion? First, it is dismaying. The
Court's use of the word "logic" conveyed no meaning. Logic means
analysis. If analysis means recounting pertinent legal history regarding
the statute, there was none in this opinion. As regards "semantics," the
Court rejected the opportunity to contextualize the statute. Facts about
words (after all) determine their meaning. Giving words a contemporary
meaning while ignoring the historical fact that the Act was passed to
address both racial harassment and white brutality during performance
was misleading.
72
Second, riveting good faith to the 1964 Civil Rights Act guaranteed
that a breach of duty to act in good faith would cost the plaintiff a lot of
time (spent on administrative remedies), money, and effort (overcoming
burden of proof and persuasion obstacles). Depicting a promotion as an
opportunity to make a new contract saddled the plaintiff with the duty to
scour the landscape for credible evidence to establish the intentions of the
parties which, one might imagine, costs additional time and money.
If "racial harassment" during performance demeans a person's op-
portunity to contract, there should be a civil rights action.73 This was a
relationist contract. 74 The parties were under a duty to act in good
faith.75 That meant that employers could not use race to block a promo-
tion. They could not take liberties with an employee - saddle an Afri-
can-American with more duties than whites. They could not use race to
68. Id. at 2375 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 2376.
70. Id. at 2374.
71. Id. at 2377.
72. Id. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2389.
74. Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 1090-92.
75. See id. at 1139. At a minimum, good faith arrests cheating on the terms, or opportunistic
behavior that redistributes risks already allocated by a contract. Id.; see also Constructive Condi-
tions, supra note 16, at 928-42. Good faith is broad enough to encompass doing what you're told by
a statute. In Jett, an employer is bound to do nothing that ruins a federal citizenship right. Id.; E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 527.
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block a person's access to a legal process or a legal remedy. 76 Finally,
they could not harass an African-American, hoping to fluster her, in the
midst of performance. 77
Since there was evidence of harassment and a scheme for presenting
that evidence under the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the Court should have
approved the plaintiff's instruction to the jury on the application of this
Act to contract performance. In this case, the 1866 Act and the 1964
Act were alternative remedies.
76. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
77. Such behavior amounts to prevention. Prevention is implementing a decision that makes
the other parties performance more difficult. See Shear v. National Rifle Ass'n of Am., 606 F.2d
1251 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Shear, prevention is linked with the notion of good faith. Id. at 1245-56.
Shear, a real estate agent, executed a real estate contract with the National Rifle Association (NRA).
The agent promised the NRA that he would generate offers for the purchase of the building. The
NRA promised to pay the agent for his services. Shear generated two offers. The management team
recommended the NRA accept the highest of the two bids. The offeror and the President of the
NRA signed a purchase contract, subject to the approval of the NRA's board of directors. On May
6, 1977, the parties modified their contract. The NRA promised to pay Shear $750 thousand after
the purchase contract was submitted to the board of directors for approval. Before the board could
take action on the contract, control of the NRA passed to a disgruntled group. Members of the
group, who objected to the sale of the NRA's land, passed a bylaw stripping the board of its power to
approve the purchase contract. Thereafter, the old board (operating without power) rejected the
purchase contract approved by the management team. Shear brought an action to recover contract
damages for his services. The NRA hid behind a true condition - the board's failure to approve the
purchase contract. The NRA said that the nonoccurrence of the condition excused payment.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court had to decide whether the condition was a valid de-
fense. Shear claimed that the condition was invalid because the owner prevented it from occurring.
The court of appeals wrote a decision favoring Shear. The nature of the true condition (getting a
management committee to recommend an offer and submitting the same to the board), thus the
owner's action (which created confusion about the scope and operation of the conditions namely,
board approval), bolstered Shear's depiction of NRA's action as preventative. Id. at 1256. The
court of appeals denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 1254, 1259.
In Patterson v. Meyerhoff, Meyerhoff contracted to buy land from Patterson after Patterson
acquired title to the land at a foreclosure sale. Subsequent to contract formation, Meyerhoff an-
nounced that she was going to bid and hopefully buy the disputed property at the foreclosure sale.
Meyerhoff acquired the property at the sale, outbidding Patterson in the auction process. Patterson
brought an action in equity to establish his lien on the property and, if the proceeding permitted it, a
claim for damages which equated with the sum he would have received from the contract.
Meyerhoff, 204 N.Y. 96, 98, 97 N.E. 472, 475 (1912).
On the damages issue, which plunged the court into a discussion about prevention, the court's
opinion favored Patterson. Each contracting party promises that the party "will not intentionally
and purposely do anything to prevent the other party from carrying out the agreement." Id. at 473.
Because Meyerhoff prevented the seller (Patterson) from offering the land to the buyer, Meyerhoff
breached the contract. Id.
In Iron Trade Products Co. v. Wilkoff Co., the judge was presented with a contract for the sale
of goods. Wilkhoff was the seller. Iron Trade Products (ITP) was the buyer. The goods were rails.
They were both fungible and scarce. Wilkoff could acquire them from two sources. After ITP
purchased rails from one source, the price for the remaining rails increased. Because the prices were
more than Wilkoff could afford to pay, Wilkoff did not purchase and deliver the rails he had prom-
ised ITP. ITP brought an action to recover damages. Wilkoff hid behind prevention. He claimed
that ITP's purchase prevented him from purchasing rails at a reasonable price. The court sided with
the plaintiff. "[M]ere difficulty," which goes into performance, will not excuse performance. Ad-
ding to a burden that a seller already has to shoulder to bring about performance, should not be
treated as prevention. Iron Trade Prods., 272 Pa. 172, 175, 116 A. 150, 151 (1922).
Employment Discrimination Cases
D. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 78 was a freedom of contract case.
The defendants were fish canneries that provided people with seasonal
work in Alaska. There were cannery and non-cannery jobs. The cannery
jobs were primarily filled by Alaskan natives and Filipino-Americans.
The non-cannery jobs were predominantly filled by whites (European-
Americans hired by the defendants at their home offices in Washington
and Oregon).
These employees lived hierarchical, segregated existences. The can-
nery jobs were low wage work.7 9 The non-cannery jobs were high wage.
Cannery and non-cannery employees resided in separate quarters. They
took their meals in separate diners. 80 Cannery employees brought an ac-
tion under the 1964 Civil Rights Act to invalidate and enjoin the admin-
istration of the defendant's hiring and promotion practices. 8 ' They
claimed that certain hiring and promotion practices were responsible for
racial stratification of the work force; that some practices denied non-
white employees an opportunity to secure positions as non-cannery em-
ployees. They cited nepotism, a rehire preference, the absence of
objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, and a practice of not
promoting from within as the offensive practices. They produced statisti-
cal evidence of disparate treatment. Most of the European-Americans,
they said, were in non-cannery positions. Most of the Alaskan natives
and Filipino-Americans were in low wage cannery jobs.
82
The Court decided the case under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).8 3 Employees can't use the 1964 Civil Rights Act to
impose racial quotas on employers or force them to assemble a work
force that resembles the racial composition of the surrounding commu-
nity.8 4 They can't use gross statistics (because they are meaningless) to
establish disparate treatment. 85 Petitioners must isolate the employment
practice that is responsible for the disparity.8 6 They must present an
alarming percentage signifying the difference between hired and qualified
minority applicants in the pertinent employment pool. They must prove
causality-produce evidence disclosing the impact a practice has upon
78. 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989). The Court said that it would accept ratios between qualified
minority applicants in the pertinent job pool and qualified minority applicants (hired by an em-
ployer) as evidence in employment discrimination cases. The higher the ratio the more alarming the
evidence that an employment practice (being scrutinized by a court) was discriminatory. Id.
79. Id. at 646-47.
80. Id. at 648.
81. Id. at 647-48.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 650.
84. Id. at 652-53.
85. Id. at 653-54.
86. Id. at 656-57; see id. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The racial make-up of workers in
disputed jobs should be compared to the racial composition of qualified workers in the relevant labor
market to produce statistical evidence of discrimination. Id. at 673-78.
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employment opportunities. 7 If the percentage difference between hired
and qualified applicants is insignificant within the pertinent employment
pool, the employment practice is valid.88 Assuming the petitioner has
shouldered his burden, the employer is given a trivial one. He must show
that his practice furthered an employment goal that is legitimate 9
In less than nine pages, the Court mangled a decade of cases and
loaded employees with a heavier evidence burden. Prior to this opinion,
a correlation between a promotional practice and a hurt endured by an
identifiable class of workers was enough to establish disparate treat-
ment.90 When employers had to prove that their practice was essential in
the past, they merely had to prove (henceforth) that the practice was
legitimate. 91 The Court diluted Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 9 2 and barred
the use of undifferentiated statistical evidence depicting a work force
stratified by race.93 It branded the evidence as useless. 94 It saddled peti-
tioners with a duty to prove causality which weakened the prospects that
an employee would recover anything.
87. Id. at 656-57.
88. Id. at 650-51, 656-57.
89. Id. at 654-55.
90. Id. at 672-73.
91. Id. at 657-58.
92. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). If a state has a history of racial discrimination; if people have pro-
jected their cultural feelings upon someone else, or said, manual labor is the only thing African-
Americans are fit to do; if you see it in the job assignments in an industrial plant in the state; if the
plant has discriminated against African-American workers in the past, justice requires the plant to
do nothing to perpetuate this situation. Id. at 430. This is the warning entombed in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.
In Griggs, company employees challenged the job criteria - a high school diploma or passage
of two written tests - limiting a person's entry into higher paying positions in the power company's
plant. Despite evidence that "these two requirements operated to render ineligible a markedly dis-
proportionate number of Negroes," the Court of Appeals held that: (a) there was no showing of an
intent to discriminate on account of race and (b) there was no Title VII violation. Id. at 429. The
Supreme Court trumpeted a different tune. An employer may violate Title VII even when acting in
good faith and without invidious intent. Id. at 432. If there is a positive correlation between a
criterion in a job description and the exclusion of a large number of blacks, the job criterion is
suspect. The Court held that tests and diplomas (certificating work) must illuminate job related
skills and ability as well as predict the test taker's performance. Id. at 431.
Under the guise of following the law, the Supreme Court changed the law established in Griggs.
See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661-65, 669-73 (1989)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Using a plurality opinion - which shouldn't carry much weight - the Court jettisoned the notion
that an employment practice illuminates and measures job-related skills and practices. Id. at 672.
The notion that the practice be essential to job performance was replaced with the notion that the
practice had to promote, or somehow enhance, an employer's goal. Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
Using the same plurality opinion, the Court added a requirement to the burden of proof shouldered
by employees. Id. Now, employees must "isolate and identify the specific employment practices
that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities." Id. at 656.
Wards Cove Packing is a tragic and shameful decision. The change wrought by the Court
creates a daunting task for employees. The addition tips the judicial scale in favor of the employer.
Id. at 673. The change and the addition - read into Griggs - make a sham of the goal that
Congress and a unanimous Court reached - razing employment schemes preserving the conse-
quences of past discrimination. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
93. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 652.
Employment Discrimination Cases
E. Martin v. Wilks
The last case is Martin v. Wilks.95 Plaintiffs, two groups of African-
Americans, filed lawsuits against the city of Birmingham and the Jeffer-
son County personnel board. They claimed that both entities discrimi-
nated in their hiring and promotion practices. 96 After the district court
reached a decision on the hiring issue, but before a decision was reached
on promotions, the parties made settlements in the form of consent
decrees.
97
These agreements set forth an extensive remedial scheme, including
long-term and interim annual goals for hiring and promoting black em-
ployees. 98 They were trumpeted as consent decrees after the Court heard
complaints about their scope and operation.99 At the hearing convened
by the district court, the Birmingham Fire Fighters Association (repre-
senting white employees) portrayed these agreements as illegal, claiming
they amounted to reverse discrimination. 100 The compacts clashed with
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 101 The Association requested
injunctive relief. On a civil procedure ground, the rule on intervention,
the Court gave them nothing.102
Thereafter, a new set of complainants (Wilks) brought an action to
challenge the implementation of the consent decrees. The district court
said the complainants could not collaterally attack the consent decrees.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, siding with the complainants,
reversed that decision. 10 3 The Supreme Court sided with the Eleventh
Circuit. °4 Because the complainants were neither parties nor privies to
the consent decrees, the complainants' independent claim for unlawful
discrimination was not precluded. 0 5
The Court used Rules 19 and 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.10 6 A plaintiff should join other people in a lawsuit when there's a
possibility that a judgment or a consent decree will conflict. 'A plaintiff
cannot use a third-party complainant's "knowledge of a lawsuit" and
95. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). The Court said the litigants must include everyone who might be
affected negatively in the settlement agreement. Defenders of the settlement can't use the federal
rule of intervention to fortify the agreement against third party complaints about validity. Id. at
765.
96. Id. at 759; see id. at 774-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(noting that other officials were in the
original suit).
97. Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 774-75.
100. Id. at 758-59, 776; see id. at 775-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(decision approving consent
decrees had no suggestion that agreements were collusive or fraudulent).
101. Id. at 758-59.
102. Id. at 759; see id. at 777-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(Court found white firefighters' motion
to intervene untimely).
103. Id. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 761.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 763-68.
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"his opportunity to intervene," which he never exercises, to either cor-
rect a mistake in joinder or block another lawsuit. 107
What can one say about this decision? It is stunning. The Supreme
Court hid in a thicket of civil procedure to cast aspersions upon affirma-
tive action. This is, in a sense, a, legality case. 108 It dealt with a contract
arising from a dispute being processed by a court. If a contract is race
conscious, and it denies a person a contractual opportunity because of his
race, the contract is (now) invalid. In short, the Court has used Wilks to
arm disaffected white people with the power to challenge court-approved
affirmative action plans. It has encouraged litigation and drained minori-
ties of their resources. It has signaled that there's an open season on
Negroes.
III. PERSPECTIVE
Fifteen years ago America was a melting pot.1°9 Today it is five
tribes held together by their loyalty to the Constitution. The tribes trade
ideas, labor, and capital. Some secure better bargains than others be-
cause they are large and powerful. When trade is free, one can plot an
equilibrium for the group's net income. When there is a taste for dis-
crimination, there is an absolute drop in net income of the whole group
and a relative drop in the net income of the group that's the focus of






0 NET INCOME OF W
The effect of discrimination on incomes
107. Id. at 765-68.
108. See id. at 790-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(agreement conflicts with public policy); E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 16, at 327-30 (1982).
109. E. BALTZELL, supra note 11, at x (preface).
110. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 22-25 (2d ed. 1971). The OE curve is
the group's income equilibrium. OPO represents a change in the equilibrium when there's some
segregation. The lines connecting P0 and PI signify tastes for discrimination against African-Ameri-
cans. The curve POWPI represents the different amounts of discrimination. Id. at 22-25.
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Employment Discrimination Cases
You must be a numerical and an economic minority to become a victim
of discrimination.II Sadly, that is the fate of African-Americans.
In 1982 while America's industrial base sputtered and shrank, 99.7
million Americans went to work. 112 At one point, three million claimed
unemployment. In a quiet way, America changed the way it used people
and materials, capital, and manufacturing processes. 113 Having down-
sized traditional industries and the industrial bases that supported them,
the country created higher unemployment. 114 Blacks fell into surplus la-
bor pools."15 Being, for the most part, unskilled workers in a world of
technology, blacks had difficulty in finding work. 16 Education became a
necessity.' 17 Life was (once again) mean and brutish. The recent
Supreme Court decisions made the situation worse.
A contracts analysis of the Court's opinions would be a charitable
critique. The opinions were elitist in the sense that justices conversed in
language that excluded minority perspectives. 118 They reflected main-
stream values.' 19 Government, for example, can't force a business to
contract with certain groups (liberty). People can't force a business to
contract with certain persons (freedom). A business may do what it
wishes provided it does not hurt anybody. It can self-actualize at the
community's expense (individualism). Government is obliged to eradi-
cate race consciousness by making all race conscious contracts illegal. 120
Upon deeper reflection, these cases communicate a somber message.
A branch of government is saying, there's a new game in town. This
Court will dismantle federalism as we know it. It will revive and broaden
the scope of state rights. 12 1 The banner will be the tenth amendment.
111. Id. at 27-30.
112. Cook, The Molting of America, FORBES, Nov. 22, 1982, at 161, col. I [hereinafter Cook].
113. Id.
114. Id. at 161, col. 2.
115. See M. HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY 129 (1984)[hereinafter M. HAR-
RINGTON]. Blacks, rural people for much of United States history, migrated to cities after tradi-
tional industries, like steel, stopped expanding. Id. Jobs drew blacks north. Id. at 133. The
mechanization of agriculture and the destruction of many of the structures of black rural life forced
them out of the fields. Blacks, who settled in urban labor markets long after economic restructuring
was underway, lost a chance to climb America's social ladder. Id. at 125-26. These workers and
their progeny were knotted to down-sized or phased out industries. Their economic prospects were
poor. Id. at 11, 126; see also Cook, supra note 112, at 163, 167.
116. Cook, supra note 112, at 167, col. 2; M. HARRINGTON, supra note 115, at 139.
117. See M. HARRINGTON, supra note 115 at 128-32, 134.
118. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491 (1989)(Justice O'Connor re-
ferred to a minority scholar at Yale); Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflection on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1984)(minority scholarly writings not acknowl-
edged); see also Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in a Plowed-Up
Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 2-4 (1988)(importance of different perspectives in legal scholar-
ship discussed).
119. See BELLAH, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 23-25, 32, 83, 142-44, 253-55 (1985). Those values are freedom, liberty, equality, and the
accommodation of contending entrepreneurial interests. Id.; see also REEVES, AMERICAN JOUR-
NEY: TRAVELING WITH TOCQUEVILLE IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114-18 (1982).
120. City ofRichmond, 488 U.S. at 494-95.
121. Kleven, The Constitutional Philosophy ofJustice William H. Rehnquist, 8 VT. L. REV. 1, 9,
31-37, 46-53 (1983)[hereinafter Kleven].
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It's a-check upon federal power and a barricade behind which local de-
mocracy can operate. 122
At this time in our history, there is no right or correct answer to the
nation's social ills.123 Given all of the ways known to humankind for
dealing with social ills, democratic decision-making, at the state level,
will produce the most peaceful results.' 24 If blacks must be sacrificed, it
is the tribute we will pay for democracy. Federal statutes shall be given
the narrowest interpretation. 125 Some statutes should be given broad in-
terpretations when, to do otherwise, would leave obvious constitutional
wrongs uncorrected.126
There are responses to this. The first is legislation. 127 The second is
a compelling legal vision. 128 The Constitution is a check upon states'
rights. 129 The framers invested the central government with more power
than the states.130 There was some erosion of state's rights after the Civil
War. One can see it in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amend-
ments. Congress promulgated laws to protect freedmen, who were the
targets of public and private discrimination. We are ninety years re-
122. Id. at 36-37.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 46.
127. See 136 CONG. REC. S,1522 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990)(statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator
Hatch, Utah, would broaden the scope of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. He would have it cover "racial
discrimination in performance, terms, and conditions of a contract." Id. Senator Kennedy, Massa-
chusetts, would impose Rules of Construction for Civil Rights Laws. Under his bill, S.B. 2104, "No
federal law protecting the civil rights of persons shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, or remedies available under any other federal law protecting such rights." 136 CONG.
REC. S,1018, S,1020 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990)(statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Dole, Kansas,
would overturn the Lorance case. The statute of limitations would run from "the date a discrimina-
tory seniority system was adopted" or "the date on which an employee suffered an injury." 136
CONG. REC. S,1522, S,1523 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990)(statement of Sen. Dole). Senator Kennedy
would overturn Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). Any reliance upon prejudice to
make employment decisions would be illegal. 139 CONG. REC. S, 1021 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990)(state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy).
128. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Analysis might begin with Justice
Brennan's perspective in Price Waterhouse. It's a good faith case. It addressed decision-making that
affected an employee's promotion. The Supreme Court overturned the evidentiary standard the em-
ployer was obliged to carry in his defense. Id. at 237, 249-50. An employer must show that he has
done something to disavow reliance upon sex-based comments (it could be race) when: (1) the job
environment is hostile to a woman (African-American); and (2) a personnel report has been charac-
terized by an expert as a cabined view of proper behavior for women (African-Americans). Id. at
236-37, 251-52. The 1964 Civil Rights Act orders the court to look at the moment of the discrimina-
tory event. Id. at 239-41. Thereafter, the employer must present credible evidence that he would
have arrived at the same decision without the sex-based comments. Id. at 249-50. In another con-
text, the next step would be prevention. When an employer implements a decision which makes an
employee's performance burdensome, that's a breach of contract, provided, the employer was aware
of the result. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 16, at 526, 527 nn.7-8, 610-11.
129. See Bogan, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Admis-
sion of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 985-1008 (1985). The Constitution
was erected to give the central government power over the states. That sentiment is reflected in
provisions (commerce and spending powers) and clauses (supremacy) in the Constitution. The Civil
War Amendments eroded states' rights. You can see it in their wording and their legislative histo-
ies. Id.
130. Kleven, supra note 121, at 48.
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moved from slavery. If we use 1954 as an historic moment, we are barely
thirty-six years removed from a segregated society (a scheme people now
fight to preserve). 3 1 When the protection of a freedman or his progeny
vie with individualism, the freed man should win.
131. See Ayers v. Allian, 893 F.2d 732, 745-49 (1990)(development from Plessy to Brawn). In
American literature (perhaps in life) blacks are depicted as wretched people. See C. ERIC LINCOLN,
THE AVENUE, CLAYTON CITY 109-110, 267 (1988). Hunger, violence and death are their compan-
ions. Id. at 208. In a sea of uncertainty some swim to security. Id. at 208-09. Those who have
overcome travail - and there are precious few - fight for dignity, personal integrity, and a better
future for their children. Id. at 207-52. Coping with life isn't made easy when the federal judiciary
sides with people who are opposed to African-American self-improvement, or the improvement of
other oppressed people. See, e.g., G. PARKS, THE LEARNING TREE 24-40, 90-106 (1963).
Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford v. Federal Communications Commission is an example of
judicial speech-making that creates despair. Faith Center, a Hartford broadcaster, purchased a li-
cense from the Federal Communications Commission. It told the Commission that it would follow
federal rules and regulations. It breached its promise. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) launched a revocation proceeding, that would culminate with a hearing, against the licensee.
Before the hearing the FCC told the licensee that it could sell its license to a minority enterprise
pursuant to a Commission policy, and, recoup up to 70% of its capital investment. Shurberg was a
licensee applicant who wanted to fill the medial vacuum created by Faith Center's exit from the
market. It saw the minority business (to whom the license was sold) as a rival. It challenged the
FCC policy, endorsed by Congress, which authorized such sales. An administrative law judge af-
firmed the sale. The United States Court of Appeals, rejecting the option to affirm the FCC decision
on valid grounds, grabbed an opportunity to read restrictions into the fifth amendment's tolerance
for race-conscious measures. Shurburg, 876 F.2d 902, 914-15, 922, 930, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Con-
gress may enhance the economic opportunities of historically oppressed groups provided: (1) the
enhancement takes the form of legislation; (2) the legislation is accompanied by some evidence of
past societal discrimination; (3) the legislation imposes a light economic burden upon innocent third
parties; (4) the legislation overturns the effects of past discrimination; (5) there's a finding that the
government tried a race neutral policy first; (6) there's evidence that the legislation helps someone
hurt by discrimination.
The dissenting opinion in Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC thickens the despair. The
FCC solicited offers for a new broadcast license. Four offerors submitted bids. The Commission
accepted a bid from an offeror because of his ethnicity (Hispanic), community involvement and
broadcast experience. A disappointed rival challenged the validity of the grant. Any policy enhanc-
ing the economic opportunities of one race, he quipped, denies the others equal protection of the
laws.
Judge Williams saw this as a reverse discrimination case. He said: race conscious legislation,
unsettling the hopes and business aspirations of white people, is subject to the strict scrutiny test.
Winter Park Communications, 873 F.2d 347, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1989). He insisted, and I might add
incorrectly, that the Supreme Court mandated strict scrutiny in City of Richmond. Id. at 360; cf. L.
TRIBE, supra note 49, at 1530 (four-part test for classification subject to intermediate review). By
quibbling over the terminology in a federal report, challenging the methodology by which the report
was assembled, and the data, the judge showed the public how to overturn evidence supporting
affirmative action. Winter Park Communications, 873 F.2d at 359.
These cases were appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated into one case. See Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3001 (1990). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opin-
ion. Congress, he said, may use the first amendment and the Communications Act to fortify race-
conscious legislation against equal protection attacks. Race relations legislation - enhancing the
economic opportunities of historically oppressed groups - will withstand constitutional scrutiny if
it enhances broadcast diversity.
Justice O'Connor wrote a bitter dissent. Id. at 3028-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The opinion
fuels stereotypes. Id. at 3048. It sweeps aside the Court's duty to scrutinize all race-conscious
legislation (ignoring for the moment its benign nature) with the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 3012-13.
It expresses a tolerance for reverse discrimination. It undercuts individualism. Id. at 3011.
How does the Justice know that the opinion nourishes or fuels public stereotypes? Her opinion
is bereft of evidence. She intimates that reverse discrimination encompasses unsettling hopes and
business aspirations as well as settled expectations. Where are the cases for that? See L. TRIBE,
supra note 49, at 1534-37 (discussion of affirmative action cases: Bakke and Wygant). She has
misstated the Court's duty to scrutinize race-conscious legislation with the strict scrutiny test. See
L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 222-23 (1985)(Bakke not signal "radical departure in the
direction of broadened equal protection review"). Four, not five Justices, subscribed to her view in
the City of Richmond. Winter Park Communications, 873 F.2d at 357, 360 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In America, all people aspire to do justice. The trouble with the
aspiration is that the term is seldom defined by its pursuers. If justice is
the religious application of procedural and substantive rules to facts,
132
the recent civil rights cases represent injustice. Borrowing a notion sub-
scribed to by four Justices in a plurality decision to dim the promise in
Griggs - end schemes that perpetuate the consequences of past discrimi-
nation - is unjust. 133 Using an interlocutory appeal, a totally inappro-
priate procedural vehicle, to address issues such as placing a heavier
burden of proof on plaintiffs in Title VII cases, is unjust.'3 4 Using a rule
of procedure, knowing that it would overturn the promise in Griggs, is
unjust.
The alarmist cries, where do we go from here? If we have erected a
temple of injustice, in which rules are what a few people make of them,
maybe we should go away from this place. A person representing calmer
folk would say - justice is entombed in understanding.13 5 If the coun-
try's leaders have a model of society, buttressed by scientific and custom-
ary knowledge, decisions which tract with that model are just; decisions
which clash with that model are unjust. If the Justices have signed onto
decisions which clash with the model, the opinions should be called non-
sense. We don't have to abandon the temple; we don't have to "go away
from this place." We have to remind the Justices of their duty. In a
nation that aspires to do so much, we, the guardians of justice, cannot
afford to do less. 136
132. See L. THEBAUD, JUST GAMING 39, 41-42 (1989)[hereinafter L. THEBAUD].
133. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 671 n.18 (1989)(Stevens, J., dissenting);
see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1007-08 (1988)(Blackman, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)(normal business practices perpetuating "racially disparate status
quo," unless necessary business practices violate Title VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). Facially neutral business practices, or those "neutral in terms of intent," violate Title VII if
the practices maintain past discriminatory actions. Id. at 430.
134. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 663 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. L. THEBAUD, supra note 132, at 38.
136. "You know," the calm person might say, "justice is the dim vision (what our intuition tells
us about our surroundings) we see after we have gorged ourselves on facts. We have got to find
words for what's illuminated by intuition and broadcast it everywhere." Id.
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